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THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY WITH
ANNOTATIONS TO THE INDIANA DECISIONS*
THE LAW OF AGENCY
Chapter I
INTRODUCTORY MATTERS
Topic 1. Definitions
Section 1. AGENCY; PRINCIPAL; AGENT.
(1) Agency is the relationship which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and
consent by the other so to act.
(2) The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal.
(3) The one who is to act is the agent.
Comment on Subsection (1):
a. The relationship of agency is created as the result of
conduct by parties manifesting that one of them is willing for
the other to act for him subject to his control, and that the
other consents so to act. The principal must in some manner
indicate that the agent is to act for him, and the agent must
act or agree to act on his behalf and subject to his control.
b. It is not necessary that the parties intend to create the
legal relationship or to subject themselves to the liabilities
which the law imposes upon them as a result of it. On the
other hand, there is not necessarily an agency relationship
because the parties to a transaction say that there is, or
*These annotations are being prepared by a committee of the Faculty of the
College of Law of the University of Notre Dame in cooperation with The Ameri-
can Law Institute.
It is not intended to cite all cases bearing upon the subject matter of the
particular section; nor is it intended to analyze the cases which are cited. It is
intended to furnish an introduction to the leading Indiana authorities bearing upon
the rule under consideration. The object is to facilitate the comparison of the
rule under consideration with the holdings of the Indiana cases and to enable
the user more easily to form his own opinion as to whether the principles are
the same.
That part of the Restatement which is contained herein is reprinted with the
permission of The American Law Institute.
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contract that the relationship shall exist, or believe it does
exist. Agency results only if there is an agreement for the
creation of a fiduciary relationship with control by the bene-
ficiary. The characteristics indicative of agency are stated
in §§ 12-14.
* * *
Comment on Subsections (2) and (3):
c. "Principal" is a word used to describe a person who
has authorized another to act on his account and subject to
his control. It includes, therefore, both a person who has
directed another to act on his account in business dealings
or to represent him in hearings or proceedings, but who has
no control or right of control over the other's physical con-
duct, and also a person who employs another tb act in his
affairs, having such control or right to control over his con-
duct that the other is termed servant, whether or not he
renders merely manual service. The word "master" as de-
fined in §2 is not used in contrast with the word "principal,"
but as included within it. Thus, the owner of a business is
a principal not only in regard to brokers who, as to their
physical acts, are independent of his supervision, but also in
regard to salesmen who conduct business transactions under
supervision as to their conduct and who therefore come with-
in the definition of servant, and likewise in regard to janitors
whose jobs are confined to the performance of manual acts
on the premises under the owner's supervision. The word
"principal," therefore, includes both persons who are mas-
ters and persons who are principals but not masters.
d. "Agent" is a word used to describe a person authorized
by another to act on his account and under his control. In-
cluded within its meaning are both those who, whether or
not servants as described in § 2, act in business dealings
and those who, being servants, perform manual labor. An
agent may be one who, to distinguish him from a servant
in determining the liability of the principal, is called an in-
dependent contractor. Thus, the attorney at law, the broker,
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the factor, the auctioneer, and other similar persons em-
ployed either for a single transaction or for a series of trans-
actions are agents, although, as to their physical activities,
they are independent contractors. These are to be contrasted
with others, such as clerks, train conductors, and other per-
sons similarly employed, who are also agents although they
fall within the category of servants. Likewise, the janitor of
a. building or the driver of a truck is an agent as that word
is used in the Restatemerit of this Subject if he is employed
-under such conditions that he becomes a servant. For many
purposes it is immaterial whether or not one who is an agent
is also a servant. However, the liability of a master for the
torts of his servant is greater in extent than the liability of
a principal for the torts of an agent who is not a servant (see
§§ 219-255), and a master's duties to servants are different
from those of a principal to agents who are not servants
(see §§ 472-528).
Annotation:
The following Indiana cases deal with the relationship of principal and agent,
and indicate agreement with the definitions given: Kingan & Co. Limited v.
Silvers, 13 Ind. App. 80, 37 N. E. 413 (1895); Indiana Insurance Ca. v. Hartwell,
123 Ind. 177 (1889); Indiana Insurance Co. v. Hartwell, 100 Ind. 666 (1884).
Subsection (2). An agent is one who acts for or in the place of another,
denominated the principal in virtue of power or authority conferred by the
latter to whom an account must be rendered. Rowe, Trustee, v. Rand, Receiver,
111 Ind. 206 (1887).
Subsection (3). Any one who by authority performs an act for another.
Wynegar v. State, 157 Ind. 577, 62 N. E. 38 (1901). A person employed by an-
other to act for him. Nichols v. State, 28 Ind. App. 674, 63 N. E. 783 (1902).
One who is either expressly or impliedly invested with authority from his prin-
cipal to act in his place and behalf. Internatonal Building & Loan Co. v. Watson,
158 Ind. 508, 64 N. E. 23 (1902).
Section 2. MASTER; SERVANT; INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
(1) A master is a principal who employs another to per-
form service in his affairs and who controls or has the right
to control the physical conduct of the other in the performance
of the service.
(2) A servant is a person employed by a master to per-
form service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the per-
formance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right
to control by the master.
(3) An independent contractor is a person who contracts
with another to do something for him but who is not con-
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trolled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control
with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the
undertaking.
Comment:
a. A master. is a species of principal, and a servant is a
species of agent. The words "master" and "servant" are here-
in used to indicate the relationship from which arises the
tort liability of an employer to third persons for the tort of
an employee (see §§ 219-249), and the special duties and
immunities of an employer to the employee (see §§ 473-
528.) The factors which are of importance in determining
whether or not the person is a servant or an independent
contractor are stated in § 220. The distinction between serv-
ants and agents who are not servants is of importance only
for the purposes of those Sections, and statements made in
the Restatement of this Subject as applicable to principals
or agents are, unless otherwise stated, applicable to masters
and servants. The rules as to liability of a principal for the
torts of agents who are not servants are stated in §§ 250-267,
and as to his liability to such agents in §§ 470-472. The
duties of servants to masters and their liabilities to third
persons are the same as those of agents who are not servants.
However, servants do not ordinarily have possession of
goods entrusted to them by the master (see Comment h on
§ 339 and §349), and a servant, because of his position, may
not be responsible for mistakes made by him as to facts
upon which his authority depends, where an agent not a
servant would be (see Comment c on § 383).
b. The word "servant" is used in contrast with "inde-
pendent contractor," a term which includes all persons who
contract to do something for another and who are not serv-
ants with respect thereto. An agent who is not a servant is,
therefore, an independent contractor when he contracts to
act on account of the principal. Thus, a broker who contracts
to sell goods for his principal is an independent contractor
as distinguished from a servant. Although, under some con-
ditions, the principal is bound by the broker's unauthorized
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contracts and representations, the principal is not liable to
third persons for tangible harm resulting from his unauthor-
ized physical conduct within the scope of the employment,
as the principal would be for similar conduct by a servant;
nor does the principal have the duties or immunities of a
master towards the broker. While an agent who contracts
to act and who is not a servant is therefore an independent
contractor, not all independent contractors are agents. Thus,
one who contracts for a stipulated price to build a house for
another who reserves no direction over the conduct of the
work is an independent contractor; but he is not an agent
since he is not a fiduciary, has no power to make the one
employing him a party to a transaction, and is subject to no
control as to his conduct.
The word "servant" is thus used to distinguish a group of
persons for whose physical conduct the master is responsible
to third persons. It is convenient to distinguish this group of
persons from all other persons for whose physical conduct
the employer is not responsible. These persons fall into two
groups: those who are agents but do not respond to the tests
for servants, and those who are not agents. For the purpose
of determining whether or not the employer is responsible
for their physical conduct, however, it is immaterial
whether such persons are agents or are not agents. For this
reason the term "independent contractor" is used to indicate
all persons for whose conduct, aside from their use of words,
the employer is not responsible.
c. The words "agent," "master," and "servant" are fre-
quently used in statutes with a limited meaning. The defini-
tions of these words in this Section are not applicable in the
interpretation of such statutes.
Annotation:
Subsections (1) and (2). Kingan & Co. Limited v. Silvers, 13 Ind. App.
80, 37 N. E. 413 (1895); Indiana Iron Co. v. Cray, 19 Ind. App. 565, 48 N. E.
803 (1897); Indiana Union Traction Co. v. Benadum, 42 Ind. Aply. 121, 83
N. E. 261 (1908); Muncie Foundry & Machine Co. v. Thompson, 70 Ind. App.
157, 123 N. E. 196 (1919). Discussion of bow existence of relationship is to be
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determined. Standard Oil Co. v. Allen, 121 N. E. 329 (Ind. 1918), rehearing denied,
123 N. E. 693, and both superseded by opinion in Supreme Court, 126 N. E. 674.
Subsection 3. Naylor v. Holland-St. Louis Sugar Co., 75 Ind. App. 132, 130
N. E. 152 (1921); McGee v. Stockton, 62 Ind. App. 555, 113 N. E. 388 (1916);
Presto-O-Lite Co. v. Skeel, 182 Ind. 593, 106 N. E. 365, Ann.'Cas. 1917A, 474
(1914); Marion Shoe Co. v. Eppley, 181 Ind. 219, 104 N. E. 65, Ann. Cas. 1916D,
220 (1914); Schnurr v. Board of Commissioners of Huntington County, 22 Ind.
App. 188, 53 N. E. 425 (1899); Indianapolis, B. & W. R. Co. v. O'Reily, 38 Ind.
140 (1871); Marks v. The Indianapolis B. & W. R. Co., 38 Ind. 440 (1871);
New Albany Forge & Rolling Mills v. Cooper, 131 Ind. 363, 30 N. E. 294 (1891).
Section 3. GENERAL AGENT; SPECIAL AGENT.
(1) A general agent is an agent authorized to conduct a
series of transactions involving a continuity of service.
(2) A special agent is an agent authorized to conduct a
single transaction or a series of transactions not involving
continuity of service.
Comment:
a. The distinction between a general agent and a special
agent is one of degree, as is the distinction between a servant
and an independent contractor, and the resulting differences
in liability of the principal are based in part upon similar
grounds of policy. In determining whether an agent is a
general agent or a special agent, the number of acts to be
performed in accomplishing an authorized result, the num-
ber of people to be dealt with, and the length of time needed
to accomplish the result are important considerations. The
manager of a business or the agent in charge of a construc-
tion project is clearly a general agent for the one employing
him. On the other hand, a person 'employed only to deliver
a promissory note on specified terms is just as clearly a spe-
cial agent. Between such cases, in which the class to which
the agent belongs is clear, are other cases which require the
use of judgment to determine in which class the agent be-
longs. Thus, one directed by another to purchase two horses,
although the purchase may be made from two separate in-
dividuals, would ordinarily be a special agent; a person
employed to buy one hundred horses in as many transactions
as may be necessary to accomplish the total purchase might
well be considered a general agent.
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b. One who is a general agent with respect to some things
may be a special agent with respect to the particular trans-
action, as where the owner of a manufacturing business
directs his manager to purchase a country estate for him.
c. A general agent may have little discretion in regard
to the transactions which he is employed to perform, while
a special agent may have great discretion in the single trans-
action which he conducts. Thus, one is a general agent if he
is in continuous employment, although the employment con-
sists of purchasing articles as the employer directs with no
discretion as to the kinds, amounts, or prices to be paid;
while one employed to purchase a single article would be a
special agent although given the widest discretion, as where
one is directed to purchase any suitable article as a wedding
gift.
d. The distinction between a special agent and a general
agent has several important consequences. First, the gen-
eral agent may have a power to bind his principal in excess
of his authority or apparent authority in many situations
in which the special agent may not have such power (see
§§ 161, 194). Again, the continuity of the employment of the
general agent may result in the. continuance of apparent
authority after the termination of his authority when this
would not result in the case of a special agent (see §§ 127-
132). Furthermore, manifestations of the principal to a
general agent in conection with his authority may be in-
terpreted as merely advice or as instructions not intended
to affect the rights of third persons, when similar manifesta-
tions made to a special agent would be interpreted as limit-
ing his authority or power to bind the principal (see Com-
ment b on § 34).
Annotation:
Subsection 1. The Indiana cases defining general agent -are in substantial
accord with the stated definition. Cruzan v. Smith, 41 Ind. 288 (1872); Fatman
v. Leet, 41 Ind. 133 (1872); Robinson v. Bank of Winslow, 42 Ind. App. 350,
85 N. E. 793 (1908); Thompson v. Michigan Mutual Life Insurance Co., 56
Ind. App. 502, 105 N. E. 780 (1914); The Cleveland, C., C. & L Ry. Co. v.
Closser, 126 Ind. 348, 26 N. E. 159, 9 L. R. A. 754, 22 Am. St. Rep. 593 (1890);
Cleveland, C., C., & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Moore, Receiver, 170 Ind. 328, 82
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
N. E. 52 (1907); Glazer v. Hook, 74 Ind. App. 497, 129 N. E. 249 (1920);
Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399 (1866); Longworth v. Conwell, 2 Blackf. 469
(1831)..
Subsection 2. Nearly all cases cited under Section 3, Subsection- (1), de-
fine and distinguish between general and special agents. The following cases
deal with special agencies: Buchanan v. Caine, 57 Ind. App. 274, 106 N. E.
885 (1914); Rich v. Johnson, 61 Ind. 246 (1878); Davis v. Talbot, Receiver,
137 Ind. 235, 36 N. E. 1098 (1894); Blackwell v. Ketcham, 53 Ind. 184 (1876);
Berry v. Anderson, 22 Ind. 36 (1864); Reitz v. Martin, 12 Ind. 306, 74 Am.
Dec. 215 (1859); Pursley v. Morrison, 7 Ind. 356, 63 Am. Dec. 424 (1855).
Section 4. DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL; PARTIALLY DISCLOSED PRINCI-
PAL; UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL.
(1) If, at the time of a transaction conducted by the agent,
the other party thereto has notice that the agent is acting for
a principal and of the principal's identity, the principal is dis-
closed.
(2) If the other party has notice that the agent is or may
be acting for a principal but has no notice of the principal's
identity, the principal for whom the agent is acting is partially
disclosed.
(3) If the other party has no notice that the agent is act-
ing for a principal, the principal is undisclosed.
Comment:
a. The classification of principals into disclosed, partially
disclosed, and undisclosed is for the purpose of simplifying
the statement of the rules determining the legal relations of
the third person with respect to the principal and the agent,
since many of these relations are dependent upon notice to
the third person of the existence and identity of the prin-
cipal. The other party has notice of the existence or identity
of the principal if he knows, has reason to know, or should
know of it, or has been given a notification of the fact. See
§ 9 for the meaning of the word "notice."
b. Manifestations at time of transaction. Whether a prin-
cipal is a disclosed principal, a partially disclosed principal
or an undisclosed principal depends upon the manifestations
of the principal or agent and the knowledge of the other
party at the time of the transaction. The disclosure of the
existence or identity of the principal later has no bearing
upon the relations created at the time of the transaction.
The nondisclosure of the principal on the face of a docu-
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ment integrating the transaction does not of itself indicate
that the principal is undisclosed, although it may affect the
liability of the parties to the transaction. Thus, where a
simple contract is made in the name of the agent, but the
other party knows that the principal is the contracting
party and intends to contract with him, the contract is with
the principal as a disclosed principal, although his name
does not appear in the instrument (see § 149); and this is
so even though the agent, in a suit by the other party, may
not be able to escape liability (see § 323).
c. Sources of third person's knowledge. Ordinarily, the
third person derives his knowledge as to the existence or
identity of the principal from the agent or the principal in
the transaction with them, but his legal relations with the
principal are not affected by the source of his knowledge.
The agent may, however, manifest that he contracts only
for himself and thereby exclude the principal as a party to
the transaction (see § 150).
If the manifestations of the principal or agent are such
as reasonably indicate to the other party the identity or
existence of the principal, the latter is disclosed or partially
disclosed, and this is true although the other party believes
that he is dealing with the agent alone. On the other hand,
although the agent purports to be acting on his own account,
if the other party knows that he is acting as agent, the
principal is not an undisclosed principal but is either a dis-
closed principal or a partially disclosed principal, depend-
ing upon the nature of the other party's knowledge. If the
manifestation as to agency is ambiguous, the belief of the
other party, if reasonable, is conclusive.
d. Disobedience as to concealment or disclosure of princi-
pal. The fact that the agent disobeys instructions to conceal
the principal's identity or existence does not prevent the
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principal from being a disclosed or partially disclosed prin-
cipal, nor prevent the application to him of the rules relating
to disclosed or partially disclosed principals (see § 163).
The fact that the agent disobeys instructions to reveal the
existence or identity of the principal does not prevent him
from being an undisclosed principal if the other party has
no notice of his existence; and the rules relating to undis-
closed principals apply to him (see § 197).
e. When principal is or is not identified. Whether a prin-
cipal is a disclosed principal or a partially disclosed principal
depends upon whether or not the third person has sufficient
information or other notice as to his identity. This is a ques-
tion of degree. If the manifestation of the principal or agent
to the third person, or the information the third person has,
is such that he is able to or should be able to distinguish
the principal from all others, or he otherwise has notice of
the principal's identity, the principal is disclosed. If the
manifestation is ambiguous and the third person has no
reason to know which of two or more principals the agent
is representing, the principal is partially disclosed. If the
manifestation is ambiguous and the third person is reason-
ably mistaken as to the person for whom the agent acts,
there is no contract with the principal (see Restatement,
Contracts, § 71).
Annotation:
No cases are found defining the terms covered by this section.
The cases dealing with problems of undisclosed principals seem to make no
distinction between what are herein designated as undisclosed, and partially
disclosed principals. Where a descriptive word, "Cash," was affixed to the name
of the cashier of a bank, indicating that the cashier acted in a representative
capacity, the bank was allowed to sue as undisclosed principal, Nave v. Hadley,
74 Ind. 155 (1881); where third party dealt with agent as a principal, the prin-
cipal was allowed to sue on the contract, Rathbone v. Sanders, 9 Ind. 217 (1857).
Third party having no knowledge that agent was not principal, principal sued as
undisclosed principal, Johnson v. Hoover, 72 Ind. 3Q5 (1880), and Thomas v.
Atkinson, 38 Ind. 248 (1871).
Section 5. SUBAGENT.
A subagent is a person to whom the agent delegates, as his
agent, the performance of an act for the principal which the
agent has been empowered to perform through his own repre-
sentative.
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Comment:
a. An agent may be authorized to appoint another person
to perform an act for the principal which the agent is au-
thorized to perform or to have performed. The agreement
may be that upon the appointment of such a person the
agent's function as agent is performed, and that thereafter
the person so appointed is not to be the representative of
the agent but is to act solely on account of the principal, in
which case the one so appointed is an agent and not a sub-
agent. On the other hand, the agreement may be that the
appointing agent is to undertake the performance of the
authorized act either by himself or by someone else and
that the person so appointed while doing the act on ac-
count of the principal is also, in so doing, to be the agent
of the appointing agent, who consequently will have the
responsibility of a principal with respect to such person. If
this is the agreement, the person so appointed is a subagent.
What the agreement is depends, as do other agreements, up-
on the manifestations of the parties as interpreted by the
usages between them, the customs of business, and all other
circumstances (see §§ 77-81). A person may be a subagent
although the appointing agent has no authority to appoint
him. This is so if the agent has apparent authority to make
the appointment, or if he otherwise has power to bind the
principal, as where he is a general agent and the appoint-
ment of a subagent is an ordinary incident of his position,
although forbidden in the particular instance (see § 161).
b. Types of subagents. The subagent may be an employee
of the agent or he may be a person not in the general em-
ployment of the agent but appointed for a specific under-
taking. Thus, the receiving teller of a bank which acts as
an agent in the collection of a note is a subagent with re-
spect to clients of the bank; another bank to which the
depositary bank sends a note for collection may also be a
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subagent. The inference is that the regular employees of an
agent are subagents; there is no inference in the case of
other persons selected by an agent to act for the principal,
except that if the person so employed is a public officer, as
in the case of a notary not employed continuously, it is in-
ferred that he is not a subagent.
c. Liabilities resulting from subagency. A subagent acting
in the performance of acts which the appointing agent has
authorized him to perform in accordance with an authoriza-
tion from the principal is an agent of the principal and
affects the relations of the principal to third persons as fully
as if the appointing agent had done such acts (see § 142).
Futhermore, the subagent stands in a fiduciary relation to
the principal, and is subject to all the liabilities of an agent
to the principal except liability dependent upon the existence
of a contractual relationship between them (see § 428 (1)).
Likewise, the principal may have correlative duties to the
subagent (see § 458).
The subagent is also the agent of the appointing agent,
with power to subject the appointing agent to liability to
the principal for his defaults in the performance of the prin-
cipal's business (see § 406), and to third persons for his
acts within the scope of his authority or employment (see
§ 362). Likewise, the appointing agent has the same rights
and liabilities with respect to the subagent as any other
principal has to his agent (see §§ 428 (2) and 459).
Annotation:
No definition of subagent is found in an Indiana case but the following cases
recognize and enforce principal's obliaticn and rights in accordance with the
stated definition: Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. v. Jester, 180 Ind. 357, 101 N. E.
915, L. R. A. 1915E, 721 (1913); Indiana Insurance Co. v. Hartwell, 123 Ind.
177, 24 N. E. 100 (1890); Thompson v. Michigan Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
56 Ind. App. .502, 105 N. E. 780" (1914).
Section 6. POWER.
A power is an ability on the part of a person to produce
a change in a given legal relation by doing or not doing a given
act.
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Comment:
a. The word "power" denotes not a physical or mental
quality but a legal attribute, the ability to change legal
relations. This ability may be rightfully exercised, as where
an agent makes an authorized contract; or it may be wrongly
exercised, as where an agent, having apparent authority so
to do, makes an unauthorized contract.
b. A power may be held by any person, irrespective of
legal capacity to contract or to be subject to liability. It may
exist irrespective of the consent or knowledge either of the
one subject to it or of the one holding it. Thus, a thief of
a negotiable instrument payable to bearer has power to pass
title to a third person although the owner does not even
know that the instrument has been stolen. Likewise, a per-
son whom another authorizes to act on his account has a
power to bind the other although he has neither legal capac-
ity to bind himself nor the desire to act for the one who has
conferred the power upon him.
Annotation:
No Indiana case was found wherein the court uses the term power as de-
fined above.
Section 7. AUTHORITY.
Authority is the power of the agent to affect the legal re-
lations of the principal by acts done in accordance with the
principal's manifestations of consent to him.
Comment:
a. Authority includes only the power which an agent has
to affect the relations of his principal, in the exercise of
which he is privileged with respect to his principal. Authority
exists only in accordance with manifestations of the prin-
cipal and, as to transactions capable of delegation to the
agent, by a principal who has capacity to give consent and
to become a party to the transaction.
b By manifestation is meant the expression of the prin-
cipal's will as distinguished from undisclosed purpose or in-
tention. The manifestation to the agent must be prior to
of contemporaneous with an act done by the agent in order
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to confer authority upon the agent. A manifestation of con-
sent by the principal after the agent has acted may result in
ratification (see § 82).
c.. The manifestation may be made by words or other con-
duct, including acquiescence. Sections 26-31 state the man-
ner in which it may be made. The rules for the interpreta-
tion of the manifestation are stated in §§ 32-81.
d. The fact that the third person with whom the agent
deals on account of the principal has no knowledge of the
manifestations of the principal or even of the principal's
existence, does not prevent the agent from having authority
to make the principal a party to the transaction in accord-
ance with his instructions. This is true even though the
agent acts in accordance with instructions given in error or
acts after the principal has withdrawn his consent, if neither
the agent nor the third person has notice of such error or
withdrawal. If, however, the third person has notice of such
error or withdrawal, the agent has no power to bind the
principal to him although the agent, if without notice, is
privileged to deal with him.
Annotation:
By inference of law an agent has authority to do any and all acts neces-
sarily incident to the performance of the duty intrusted to him by the principal.
American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Green, 164 Ind. 349, 73 N. E. 707 (1905). Principal
is bound by authority manifested and not relieved by breach of instructions.
La Rue v. Ameican Diesel Engine Co., 176 Ind. 609, 96 N. E. 772 (1911) ; The
Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis and Chicago Railway v. Davis, 126 Ind. 99,
25 N. E. 878, 9 L. R. A. 503 (1890); The Commercial Union Assurance Co. v.
The State, 113 Ind. 331, 15 N. E. 518 (1888); Robbins v. Magee, 76 Ind. 381
(1881) (Escrow) ; Fatman v. Leet, 41 Ind. 133 (1872); Manning v. Gasharie,
27 Ind. 399 (1866); Longworth v. Conwell, 2 Blackf. 469 (1831).
Section 8. APPARENT AUTHORITY.
Apparent authority is the power of an apparent agent to
affect the legal relations of an apparent principal with respect
to a third person by acts done in accordance with such prin-
cipal's manifestations of consent to such third person that
such agent shall act as his agent.
Comment:
a. An apparent agent is a person who, whether or not au-
thorized, reasonably appears to third persons, because of the
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manifestations of another, to be authorized to act as agent
for such other. An apparent principal is the person for whom
an apparent agent purports to act. The apparent agent may
have authority which is coextensive with his apparent au-
thority; he may be authorized to act in other ways but not
in the way as to which he has apparent authority; or he may
not be authorized to act in any respect for the purported
principal. If the authority and the apparent authority are
coextensive, the liability of the principal resulting from con-
duct of the agent may be based upon either authority or ap-
parent authority.
b. The manifestation that another is to act as agent may
be made to the community in general, by advertisements or
otherwise. Apparent authority, however, exists only with
respect to a person to whom such a manifestation has been
made or to whom knowledge of it comes.
c. Where an agreement is made between a third person
and an agent acting within the scope of his apparent au-
thority, the fact that the third person gives nothing but a
promise and does not otherwise change his position in re-
liance upon the appearance of authority does not prevent
the transaction from being a contract upon which both the
principal and the third person are mutually subject to lia-
bility. In this respect, apparent authority conforms to the
principles of contracts; there is a manifestation of consent
by the principal to the third person and, in case of a bilateral
transaction, a counter-manifestation by the third person
which completes the transaction. As in the case of other con-
tracts, there may be a unilateral transaction, as where an
apparent agent makes an offer which becomes binding upon
an act being done by the third person with intent to accept
the offer.
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d. "Apparent authority" is to be distinguished from "in-
ferred authority," which indicates ;authorization created
otherwise than by express language and which has no refer-
ence to an appearance of authority created by the prin-
cipal's manifestations directed toward third persons. There
may be "inferred apparent authority."
Annotation:
The following cases dealing with liability of principal for acts of agent when
done within apparent authority show accord with the definition in this section.
Adams Ex. Co. v. Byers, 177 Ind. 33, 95 N. E. 513 (1911); Lake Shore & Michi-
gan Southern Ry. Co. v. Foster, 104 Ind. 293, 4 N. E. 20, 54 Am. Rep. 319
(1885); Indianapolis, Bloomington & Western Ry. Co. v. Adamson, 114 Ind.
282, 15 N. E. 5 (1888). The appearance of authority must be by manifestation of
the principal. Lucas v. Rader, 29 Ind. App. 287, 64 N. E. 488 (1902); Robinson
& Co. v. Nipp, 20 Ind. App. 156, 50 N. E. 408 (1898).
Topic 2. Knowledge and Notice
Section 9. NOTICE.
(1) A person has notice of a fact if he or his agent knows
the fact, has reason to know it, should know it, or has been
given a notification of it.
(2) A person is given notification by another if the latter
(a) informs him of the fact or of other facts from which
he has reason to know or should know the fact; or
(b) does an act which, under the rules applicable to the
transaction, has the same effect on the legal relations
of the parties as the acquisition of knowledge.
Comment:
a. The legal relations of a person are frequently affected
by his knowledge, or by the existence of facts because of
which he is treated, for the purpose in question, as if he
had knowledge. To express the idea that legal relations
may be changed because of knowledge or something equiv-
alent thereto in the particular case, the word "notice" is
used. For some purposes, one has notice of a fact only if he
has such knowledge concerning it that to act in disregard
of it constitutes bad faith; for other purposes one has
notice of a fact of which he has reason to know or of which
he should know (see Comments c and d) or if another has
done an act amounting to a notification (see Comment e).
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b. Use of "notice" in Restatement. Under the definition
in this Section a person has notice of a fact if he has knowl-
edge or reason to know of it, should know of it, or has been
given a notification of it; and hence it would be permissible
to state that a legal result follows if a person has notice of a
fact, although the result would follow only if the person were
to have knowledge of the fact, or would follow only if the
person were to have reason to know of the fact. In the Re-
statement, however, for purposes of clarity, where it is
stated that a legal result follows if a person'has notice of a
fact and there is no qualification in the Comment or other-
wise, it means that the result follows if such person, in the
alternative, has knowledge of the fact, or reason to know of
it, or should know of it, or has been given a notification.
When only knowledge has the effect stated, the word "knowl-
edge" is used; likewise, where, to constitute notice, it is
necessary that the person have reason to know of the fact,
that he should know of it, or that he should receive a notifi-
cation, the particular requirement is stated.
c. Reason to know. A person has reason to know of a fact
if he has information from which a person of ordinary intel-
ligence, or of the superior intelligence which such person may
have, would infer that the fact in question exists or that
there is such a substantial chance of its existence that, if ex-
ercising reasonable care with reference to the matter in ques-
tion,. his action would b'e predicated upon the assumption of
its possible existence. The inference drawn need not be that
the fact exists; it is sufficient that the likelihood of its exist-
ence is so great that a person of ordinary intelligence, or
of the superior intelligence which the person in question has,
would, if exercising ordinary prudence under the circum-
stances, govern his conduct as if the fact existed, until he
could ascertain its existence or nonexistence. The words
"reason to know" do not necessarily import the existence
of a duty to others to ascertain facts; the words are used
both where the actor has a duty to another and where he
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would not be acting adequately in the protection of his own
interests were he not to act with reference to the facts which
he has reason to know. One may have reason to know a fact
although he does not make the inference of its existence
which would be made by a reasonable person in his posi-
tion and with his knowledge, whether his failure to make
such inference is due to inferior intelligence or to a failure
properly to exercise such intelligence as he has. A person
of superior intelligence or training has reason to know a
fact if a person with his mental capacity and attainments
would draw such an inference from the facts known to him.
On the other hand, "reason to know" imports no duty to
ascertain facts not to be deduced as inferences from facts
already known; one has reason to know a fact only if a
reasonable person in his position would infer such fact
from other facts already known to him.
d. Should know. A person should know of a fact if a per-
son of ordinary prudence and intelligence, or the intelligence
which such person has or professes to have, would ascertain,
in the performance of his duty to another, that such fact
exists or that there i such a substantial chance of its exist-
ence that his action would be predicated upon its possible
existence. The words "should know" express the idea that
the person of whom they are spoken has a duty to others
to ascertain facts or, if he does not ascertain them, to act
with reference to the likelihood that such facts exist. In
conduct not involving consensual relations, a person is re-
quired to ascertain what would be ascertained by a person
of ordinary intelligence exercising ordinary care in the pro-
tection of his own interests or those of others, unless he has
superior attainments, in which case he is required to ex-
ercise the intelligence which he has. In consensual trans-
actions, he should know what a person with the knowledge
or skill which he professes would ascertain.
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e. Notification. Under normal circumstances an act con-
stituting notification results in knowledge to the person
notified; but although notification is an act having some re-
lation to the receipt of knowledge by the person notified, it
may be performed and result in notice to such person al-
though he does not thereby acquire knowledge; it may con-
sist of acts which, although normally resulting in knowledge
by the one notified or someone acting for him, do not so re-
sult in the particular case. This is true where an agreement,
commercial custom, or statute provides that for certain pur-
poses the doing of specified acts, after the lapse of a time
which is reasonable under the circumstances, shall have the
effect of knowledge by the one towards whom they are
directed. In any case, the important matter is not the realiza-
tion of the facts by the one notified, but the act or other
event which in the particular case is considered sufficient
either to apprise the one notified or to create such likelihood
of his being apprised that for the purposes of the case the
consequences are the same.
* * *
f. In the absence of a special custom, there is notice only
in favor of the person giving the notification and his suc-
cessors in interest or, if given on behalf of another, in favor
of such other if the other has authorized or ratified it. As to
others, the effect of notification is merely that of information
received by the person notified if the notification results
in knowledge by him. The acts required for notification by
principal or agent to each other are stated in § 11. The acts
required for notification to a third person of a change in
the agent's authority are stated in § 136.
* * *
g. Notice tkrougk an agent. By the rules of agency, notice
is sometimes attributed to a principal because of knowledge
which his agent has, has reason to have, or should have, as
well as because of a notification given to the agent. The
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rules by which a principal is affected with respect to third
persons because of the knowledge of or notification to an
agent are stated in §§ 268-283. Section 90 states the rule
applicable to the ratification of a notification by a purported
agent. The rules by which a master is affected in his duties
to his servants because of the knowledge of or notification
to other servants are stated in § 496. Wherever the knowl-
edge of or notification to a servant or other agent as to a
fact is effective as against the 'principal, the principal has
notice of such fact.
Annotation:
This section defines notice. The cases cited here are not intended to apply to
problems of the effect of notice. For effect of notice in particular situations, see
appropriate titles.
Whatever puts a party on inquiry amounts in judgment of law to notice,
provided the inquiry becomes a duty and would lead to the knowledge of the
facts by the exercise of ordinary diligence and understanding. Morland v. Lemas-
ters, 4 Blackf. 383 (1837); Case v. Bumstead, 24 Ind. 429 (1865); Wilson v.
Hunter, 30 Ind. 466 (1868); Kuhns v. Gates, 92 Ind. 66 (1883) ; Blair v. Whit-
taker, 31 Ind. App. 664, 69 N. E. 182 (1903); Webb v. John Hancock Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 162 Ind. 616, 69 N. E. 1006, 66 L. R. A. 632 (1904).
Principal conclusively presumed to know what agent in charge of work knew
concerning the work. Cleveland, C., C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Moore, Receiver,
170 Ind. 328, 82 N. E. 52 (1907). Notice to agent is notice to principal. Field v.
Campbell, 164 Ind. 389, 72 N. E. 260, 108 Am. St. Rep. 301 (1904); Brannon
v. May, 42 Ind. 92 (1873). Knowledge of defendant's agent that plaintiff was in-
sane binding on defendant. Indianapolis Traction and Terminal Co. v. Henby,
178 Ind. 239, 97 N. E. 313 (1912). Evidence of communication of fact to agent
in charge held admissible to establish notice to principal. Alexander Mining and
Exploring Co. v. Irish, 16 Ind. App. 534, 44 N. E. 680 (1896).
Section 10. KNOWLEDGE WHICH PRINCIPAL OR AGENT SHOULD
HAVE INTER SE.
Unless the parties have manifested otherwise to each other,
a principal or agent, with respect to the other, should know
what a person of ordinary experience and intelligence would
know, and in addition, what he would know if, having the
knowledge and intelligence which he has or which he pur-
ports to have, he were to use due care in the performance of
his duties to the other.
Comment:
a. The rule stated in this Section is but a special applica-
tion of far-reaching rules applicable in all. branches of the
law to the effect that, while in nonconsensual transactions
the law requires a minimum standard of conduct with the
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additional requirement that one must use the knowledge and
intelligence which he in fact has, in consensual relations
and in situations where one person justifiably relies upon
the conduct of another, the standard may vary with the
agreement or with the representations as to mental and
physical attainments. The relations between principal and
agent, including those between master and servant, are so
varied that it is feasible to state only the application of the
rule to some of the common situations.
b. The principal. Unless he indicates otherwise, a prin-
cipal engaged in business represents to his agents that he
knows the business usages of the locality or localities in
which he regularly does business, that he is reasonably fa-
miliar with the laws pertaining to the business, that he has
at his command a knowledge of pertinent scientific discov-
eries, and such knowledge of the general nature of the act
which he requires to be performed by. the agent, of his own
goods and of the conditions of the premises upon which he
conducts business, as would be acquired by the exercise of
due care. For special requirements as to knowledge requi-
site to prevent harm to a servant or other agent, see §§
435, 495.
A nonprofessional and nonbusiness principal makes no
representations, by the employment of an agent to perform
business for him, as to special knowledge or skill. The
agent may, however, ordinarily assume that the principal
will have the knowledge which he will derive from communi-
cations sent to him by the agent to his place of business.
c. The agent. Unless he indicates otherwise, a business
agent represents that he understands the usages of the busi-
ness in which he is employed. One undertaking a matter
involving special knowledge ordinarily thereby represents
that he has the special knowledge required, and undertakes
that, so far as it is necessary to keep in touch with events,
he will do so. If he is a professional agent he represents
that he has the knowledge which is standard for the pro-
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
fession in which he is employed; there is, however, no rep-
resentation that his knowledge is complete and accurate (see
§ 379). If the agent maintains an office, the principal may
assume, unless he has notice to the contrary, that he will
have the information which will come from reading com-
munications delivered to a proper person at his office by the
principal or by third persons doing business with the princi-
pal through him.
Annotation:
No Indiana case has been found dealing with this principle.
Section 11. NOTIFICATION BY PRINCIPAL OR AGENT TO THE OTHER.
Unless otherwise agreed, there is a notification of a fact
by the principal to the agent or by the agent to the principal:
(a) when one of them states such fact to the other; or
(b) when a reasonable time has elapsed after a writing
stating such fact has been delivered
(i) to the other personally,
(ii) to the other's place of business.
(iii) to a place designated by the other as a place for
the receipt of business communications, or
(iv) to a place which, in view of business customs or
the relations between the parties, is reasonably
believed to be the place for the receipt of such
communications by the other.
Comment:
a. The parties may agree that any particular act shall be
notification from one to the other. The usages of the par-
ticular business may indicate that a certain act constitutes
notification, as where the owner of a business provides a
bulletin board upon which he posts documents containing
information for employees which they are required to read.
The rule stated in this Section is applicable only when there
is no agreement otherwise.
b. The requirements of Clause (b) are not met by the
mailing of a letter by the principal or the agent to the other;
the letter or message must reach the other personally, his
place of business or other designated place and, if delivered
to a person there or elsewhere, be delivered to a person who
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has authority or apparent authority to receive it. Deposit-
ing a communication in a designated receptacle, such as a
post office box held in the name of the addressee, is suffi-
cient. The principles of agency are applicable and a notifi-
cation given to an agent with power to bind his principal by
its receipt is notification to the principal (see § 268).
c. Ordinarily, written communications to an agent or prin-
cipal should be delivered to his place of business if he has
one. Another place, however, rhay be designated. If the
one addressed has no place of business and no other place
is designated, the other, in seeking to communicate with
him, may deliver communications to the place which, in
view of all the facts, he reasonably believes to be the place
at which the communication is most likely to be received,
such as his residence. Unless otherwise agreed, the mailing
of a letter by either party does not of itself constitute a
notification to the other party of the facts contained in the
letter. The communication is ineffective unless it is in such
form that the party receiving it is likely to take notice of its
contents. Thus, letters sent by other than first class mail
and in the form of circulars, if not read by the recipient,
have no effect.
d. Where a notification is made by the delivery of a writ-
ing to a proper place, the notification becomes effective as
notice when the recipient reads it, or after such time has
elapsed as is sufficient for him to become acquainted with
its contents, in light of the circumstances which exist or
which his conduct has caused the sender to believe to exist.
It becomes effective before this only if there is an agreement
that ready means of communication shall be provided. If
the principal confides business to an agent who agrees to
keep an office open regularly for the receipt of communi-
cations, a letter sent by the principal to his office ordinarily
would be effective as notice after such time as it would have
been read had the agent been attending to business, al-
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though the principal knows that the agent has gone, if this
appears to be the most feasible method of communicating
with the agent; the same principle applies to communications
sent by the agent. In matters of great importance, how-
ever, such as the termination of the relationship, the notifica-
tion may be ineffective until the other has had an oppor-
tunity of learning of the communication or until the sender
reasonably believes that such an opportunity has existed.
e. Either principal or agent can notify the other by giv-
ing a notification to- the agent of the other, in accordance
with the rule stated in § 268. If the agent employs a sub-
agent to act in the principal's business, the principal can
notify the agent by speaking or delivering a writing either
to the agent himself or, if the subagent is an authorized re-
cipient of communications, to the subagent. If the com-
munication has reference to the subagent's action, a noti-
fication given to the agent becomes effective with respect to
such action only when the agent has had an opportunity to
communicate it to the subagent; a notification to the sub-
agent is effective only if, from it, the subagent should real-
ize that it comes from the person whose business he is con-
ducting.
Annotation:
No Indiana case has been found dealing with this principle.
Topic 3. Essential Characteristics of Relationship
Section 12. AGENT AS IAOLDER OF A POWER.
An agent or apparent agent holds a power to alter the legal
relations between the principal and third persons and between
the principal and himself.
Comment:
a. The words "power of the agent" denote the ability of
an agent or apparent agent to affect the legal relations of
the principal in matters connected with the agency or ap-
parent agency. The exercise of this power may result in
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binding the principal to a third person in contract; in di-
vesting the principal of his interests in a thing, as where the
agent sells the principal's goods; in the acquisition of new
interests for the principal, as where the agent buys goods
for the principal; or in subjecting the principal to a tort lia-
bility, as where a servant, while acting within the scope of
his employment, injures a third person. The agent also has
power to alter the legal relations between himself and the
principal, creating rights and liabilities inter se by his proper
or improper exercise of authority.
When a duly constituted agent acts in accordance with his
instructions in matters as to which it is possible for a prin-
cipal to actthrough an agent (see §§ 15-19), he has power
to affect the legal relations of the principal to the same ex-
tent as if the principal had so acted. The agent's power,
however, is broader than authority, which exists only in ac-
cordance with the manifestations of the principal to the
agent, and is even broader than apparent authority, which
is dependent upon manifestations by the principal to third
persons. It includes the power which agents may have to
bind the principal to a contract or to subject him to actions
of tort, although there is neither authority nor apparent au-
thority to do the act creating liability (see §§ 140-267).
b. The power to affect the legal relations of others is not
peculiar to agents. The power of agents is distinctive, how-
ever, since it may exist solely because of the agency rela-
tion. Thus, the power which agents sometimes have to bind
their principals to a contract, although there is neither au-
thority nor apparent authority to do so (see §§ 161-176
and 194-202), is not based upon principles of contract.
Likewise, the power of servants to subject their masters to
tort liability may be based wholly upon the master-servant
relationship.
c. Ordinarily, the power of an agent includes a power to
subject the principal to personal liability. In this respect,
the agency relationship differs from that arising from a bail-
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ment, since a bailee has, as such, no power to subject the
bailor to liability in contract or in tort. It also distinguishes
the agency relationship from that of trust, executorship,
guardianship, and other similar relations, in that trustees
as such, executors, and guardians have no power to impose
personal liability upon those on whose account they act. A
trustee may, however, also be an agent and is such if ap-
pointed by the beneficiary and subject to his directions. A
trustee who is also an agent may subject his beneficiary to
personal liability as may any other agent and is subject to
the liabilities of an agent to the principal.
On the other hand, the agent's power is similar to that of
the holder of a power given as security (see § 138) who, in
certain cases, may subject the one giving the power to per-
sonal liability. Such power holders, however, are not agents
because they do not have the duty to act primarily for the
benefit of the giver of the power, nor are they subject to
his right of control.
Annotation:
Agency in its legal sense imports commercial dealings between two parties
by and through the medium of another, and the agent treats in commercial
matters with third parties for another. Kingan & Co., Limited, v. Silvers, 13
Ind. App. 80, 37 N. E. 413 (1894).
Section 13. AGENT AS A FIDUCIARY.
An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the
scope of his agency.
Comment:
a. The agreement to act on behalf of the principal causes
the agent to be a fiduciary, that is, a person having a duty,
created by his undertaking, to act primarily for the benefit
of another in matters connected with his undertaking.
Among the agent's fiduciary duties to the principal is the
duty to account for profits arising out of the employment, the
duty not to act as, or on account of, an adverse party without
the principal's consent, the duty not to compete with the
principal on his own account or for another in matters re-
lating to the subject matter of the agency, and the duty to
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deal fairly with the principal in all transactions between
them. These duties and the resulting liabilities between the
principal and agent are stated more fully in §§ 387-431.
They have an important effect upon the interpretation of
the authority conferred upon the agent (see § 39) and upon
the liabilities between the third person and the principal
(see §§ 165, 311-313).
b. The fact that an agent is subject to these fiduciary
duties distinguishes him from other persons who have power
to affect the interests of others; and the understanding that
one is to act primarily for the benefit of another is often
the determinative feature in distinguishing the agency re-
lationship from others. .Thus mortgagees, pledgees, and
other similar powerholders, although. having power to sell
the property involved under certain conditions or to sub-
ject another to contractual liability, are not agents of the
power giver; they have not undertaken to exercise such
power primarily for the benefit of the person in whose name
they formally act, and they are entitled to prefer their own
interests in dealing with the subject matter. Likewise, the
assignee of a nonnegotiable chose in action, whose right
to enforce it has been developed through the fiction of an
irrevocable power of attorney from the assignor, is not an
agent if he holds the assignment for his own benefit. A
bailee whose only duty is to hold goods for the bailor in ac-
cordance with the terms of the bailment is not an agent
since he does not have an agent's duties of loyalty and
obedience. A real estate broker whose sole function is to
find someone who will enter into a transaction with the own-
er of land is ordinarily an agent, but the agreement with
him may be such that he has no fiduciary duties and hence
is not an agent.
c. The facts in each case must be considered in determin-
ing whether or not it is understood that the primary obli-
gation of one party is to act for the benefit of the other.
The name which the parties give to the relationship is not
determinative. Likewise, the fact that one of the parties has
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subsidiary duties to act for the interests of another, as
where a purchaser of goods from a manufacturer agrees that
he will advance the interests of the manufacturer in cer-
tain respects, does not create an agency relationship with
respect to the sale. If, in such case, he is authorized to make
representations for the manufacturer, as is frequently true
of retail automobile dealers, he acts as agent in making
these although his position otherwise is that of an adver-
sary party. There are other cases where there is a dual re-
lationship, as where an agent to sell makes advances, in
which case he is in the position of a pledgee in regard to such
advances.
d. If the agent has limited capacity, as where he is an in-
fant, he may not be subject to personal liability for his fail-
ure to carry out the duties he has undertaken. If, how-
ever, he acquires something as a result of his undertaking,
for which it would be his duty to account were he of full
capacity, the principal may have quasi-contractual rights
against him or he may be charged as a constructive trustee.
It is not within the scope of the Restatement of this Subject
to state generally the liabilities of persons of limited ca-
pacity.
Annotation:
Relationship of principaf and agent is confidential and fiduciary and binds
agent to utmost good faith. Fast v. Yudy, 83 Ind. App. 85, 147 N. E. 728 (1925).
Agent must observe good faith toward principal, nut possible where agent repre-
sents both parties and interests conflict. H. H. Woodsmall v. Steele, 82 Ind. App.
58, 141 N. E. 246 (1923); Sterling Fire Ins. Co. v. Co-mision Reguladora Del
Mercado de Henequen, 195 Ind. 29, 143 N. E. 2 (1924); Cheney v. Unroe, 166
Ind. 550, 77 N. E. 1041, 117 Am. St. Rep. 391 (1906); Bedford Coal & Coke
Co. v. Parke County Coal Co., 44 Ind. App. 390, 89 N. E. 412 (1909); Criswell
v. Riley, 5 Ind. App. 496, 30 N. E. 1101, 32 N. E. 814 (1S92). All profits made
in a transaction of. agency affairs inure to principal whether derived from per-
formance or violation of duty. Indiana Trust Co. v. Byram, 36 Ind. App. 6,
72 N. E. 670 (1905). Agent cannot use principal's name for his own advantage.
Swift & Co. v. Miller, 62 Ind. App. 312, 113 N. E. 447 (1916). Agent may
not make a secret profit in a transaction in principal's behalf. Brannan v. Kelley,
83 Ind. App. 250, 148 N. E. 157 (1925). Agent under a duty to account.
Lafferty v. Jelly, 22 Ind. 471 (1864); National Bank v. Seward, 106 Ind. 264,
6 N. E. 635 (1886). Agent who receives-money by virtue of employment re-
ceives it in fiduciary capacity. Riehl v. Evansville Foundry Ass'n, 104 Ind. 70,
3 N. E. 633 (1885); Hammond v. Bookwolter, 12 Ind. App. 177, 39 N. E.
872 (1895).
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Section 14. CONTROL BY PRINCIPAL.
A principal has the right to control the conduct of the agent
with respect to matters entrusted to him.
Comment:
a. The right of control by the principai may be exercised
by prescribing what the agent shall or shall not do before the
agent acts, or at the time when he acts, or at both times.
The agent is subject to a duty not to act contrary to the
principal's directions although the principal has agreed not
to give such directions (see § 385). If the agent has notice
of facts from which he should infer that the principal would
not wish him to act as originally specified, the agent's author-
ity is terminated, suspended, or modified accordingly (see §
108). The control of the principal does not, however, in-
clude control at every moment; its exercise may be very at-
tenuated and, as where the principal is physically absent,
may be ineffective.
The extent of the right to control the physical acts of the
agent is an important factor in determining whether or not
a master-servant relationship between them exists (see
§ 220).
b. Where it is -otherwise clear that there is an agency
relationship, as in the case of recognized agents such as at-
torneys at law, factors, or auctioneers, the principal, al-
though he has contracted with the agent not to exercise con-
trol and to permit the agent the free exercise of his discre-
tion, nevertheless has power to give lawful directions which
the agent is under a duty to obey if he continues to act as
such (see § 385). Where the existence of an agency rela-
tionship is not otherwise clearly shown, as where the issue
is whether a trust or an agency has been created, the fact
that it is understood that the person acting is not to be sub-
ject to the control of the other as to the manner of perform-
ance determines that the relationship is not that of agency.
c. There are many relationships in which one acts for the
benefit of another which are to be distinguished from agency
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by the fact that there is no control by the beneficiary. Thus,
executors, guardians, and receivers, although required to act
wholly for the benefit of those on whose account the rela-
tionship has been established, are not subject to their di-
rections. A trustee, that is, one holding property in trust
for another and subject to equitable duties to deal with the
property for the other's benefit, may or may not be subject
to control in the management of the property by the one
for whose benefit he is required to act. If he is so subject,
he is also an agent, and the rules stated in the Restatement
of this Subject apply to him. The directors of a corpora-
tion for profit are fiduciaries having power to affect its re-
lations, but they are not agents of the shareholders since
they have no duty to respond to the will of the shareholders
as to the details of management. The partnership relation-
ship, while having many of the characteristics of the agency
relationship, differs from it in that a partner's power to bind
his co-partner is not subject to the co-partner's right of con-
trol unless there is an agreement to that effect.
Annotation:
Gratuitous agent liable to principal for losses occasioned by failure to observe
instructions. Criswell v. Riley, 5 Ind. App. 496, 30 N. E. 1101 (1892). Retention
of control made arrangement one of principal and agent rather than conditional
sale. Central Trust Co. of Illinois v. Duncan, 92 Ind. App. 224, 168 N. E. 506
(1929)
Chapter 2
CREATION OF RELATIONSHIP
Topic 1. Mutual Consent and Consideration
Section 15. MANIFESTATIONS OF CONSENT.
An agency relationship exists only if there has been a
manifestation by the principal to the agent that the agent
may act on his account, and consent by the agent so to act.
Comment:
a. One becomes an agent only if another in some way in-
dicates to him consent that he may act on the other's ac-
count. This consent may be communicated by any of the
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means stated in § 26, including acquiescence by the prin-
cipal in a series of acts previously done by another as agent.
A person is not an agent merely from the fact that he be-
lieves he has been authorized to act as agent for another or
purports to act as such. It is only where the person acting
believes reasonably, from conduct for which the other is re-
sponsible, that he is authorized so to act, that there is an
agency relationship. The same consequences as 'if there
were an agency may result, however, from the ratification by
the person on whose account the act is purported to be done
(see §§ 100-101).
b. The agency relationship exists only if the agent con-
sents to it. A person may, by his sole act, create a power
in another to act on his account, but since agency is a
fiduciary relationship, it can exist only if the other accepts
the power. As in the case of contractual relations, the
manifestation of the principal may be such that it is not
necessary for the acceptance to be communicated to him.
Thus, if the principal requests another to act for him with
respect to a matter, and indicates that the other is to act
without further communication and the other consents so
to act, the relationship of principal and agent exists. If,
under such conditions, the other does the requested act, it is
inferred that he acts as agent unless he manifests that he
does not so intend or unless the circumstances so indicate.
This inference is strengthened if, Deing requested to act in
the matter, the other does something which he could prop-
erly do only as an authorized agent.
c. A person who causes another to act in his affairs but
withbut the other's knowledge that he is so acting may be
subject to the duties and liabilities of a principal although
there have been no manifestations between the parties, as
where an agent of an undisclosed principal, operating a busi-
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ness for the principal, employs persons to act in the business.
Such persons have all the rights of employees with respect
to the owner of the business and are subject to some but
not all of the duties of an agent to his principal (see § 431).
Such persons also have the power of affecting the relations
of the undisclosed principal to third persons, as if such prin-
cipal had employed them directly (see § 142).
d. One acting for the benefit of another without a mani-
festation of consent by the other may subject himself to
the liabilities of an agent at the election of the principal.
Thus, one who purports to act on behalf of another but
without the authority to do so is subject to liability to the
other as if he were a disobedient agent if he affects the
principal's interests either by bindifig the principal to a
third person where he has apparent authority, or by dis-
posing of or meddling with the principal's assets (see § 430).
Likewise, although a purported agent when he acts does not
have power to affect the principal's interests, the principal
may ratify and thereby impose upon the agent the same lia-
bilities as if he originally had authority (see § 408).
e. In the requirement of mutual consent, the agency re-
lationship differs from a trust, since the beneficiary may not
have created or consented to the trust; likewise, a trustee,
unlike an agent, may act on account of a person, such as
an idiot, who is so lacking in capacity that his consent has
no effect (see the Restatement of Trusts). The agency re-
lationship is also to be distinguished from executorships,
guardianships, and receiverships which may be created in-
respective of the consent or capacity of the beneficiaries.
Annotation:
Accord: Carnahan v. Hughes, 108 Ind. 225, 9 N. E. 79 (1886); Hockett v.
Jones, 70 Ind. 227 (1880).-
Principal not bound by act of one purporting to be subagent when no assent
had been given to appointment of a subagent. Lucas v. Rader, 29 Ind. App. 287,
64 N. E. 488 (1902).
Relationship of employer -and employee is contractual and is a product
of meeting of minds and to create such a relationship there must be an express
contract or such conduct as will unequivocally show that parties recognize one
another as master and servant. Rogers v. Rogers, 70 Ind. App. 659, 122 N. E.
778 (1919).
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Section 16. CONSWERATION.
The relationship of principal and agent can be created al-
though neither party receives consideration.
Comment:
a. Agency may result from a contract between the parties
or it may result from a direction by a person to another to
act on his account with or without a promise by the other
so to act and with or without an understanding that the
other is to receive compensation for his services if he does act.
b. Where the relationship is created without consideration
on the part of either, it ordinarily may be terminated by
either without liability (see §§ 378, 450). During the exist-
ence of the relationship, however, the agent has the same
power to affect the principal's legal relations to third persons
as if there were c6nsideration in the creation of the relation-
ship.
Annotation:
No Indiana cases directly holding on this question were found; however, a
gratuitous agent was held liable to principal for damages arising from failure
to observe instructions of the principal. Criswell v. Riley, 5 Ind. App. 496, 30
N. E. 1101 (1892).
Topic 2. Delegable Acts and Powers
Section 17. WHAT AcTs Aim DELEGABLE.
A person privileged, or subject to a duty, to perform an act
or accomplish a result may properly appoint an agent to per-
form the act or accomplish the result, unless public policy or
the agreement requires personal performance; if personal
performance is required, the doing of the act by another on
his behalf does not constitute performance by him.
Comment:
a. For most purposes, a person may properly create a
power in an agent to achieve the same legal consequences
by the performance of an act as if he himself had personally
acted. The performance of a duty or the enjoyment of a
priv'ilege, however, may require personal action by the one
owing the duty or having the privilege. This is so as to the
performance of duties under a contract which calls for the
exercise of personal qualities of the contractor. Likewise,
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the privilege of entry upon land is frequently personal and
does not include the entry of servants.
b. Duties or privileges created by statute may be im-
posed or conferred upon a person to be performed or exer-
cised personally only. Whether a statute is to be so inter-
preted depends upon whether or not in view of the purposes
of the statute, the knowledge, consent or judgment of the
particular individual is required. The making of affidavits
as to knowledge and the execution of wills are illustrations
of acts commonly required by statute to be done personally.
c. The attempted exercise by an agent of a power in the
performance of a nondelegable act does not operate as the
performance of the act. Thus, one who has contracted to
perform personal services does not render the performance
although some one whom he has appointed so to act renders
services as valuable as those promised. The act of a person
who attempts to vote as agent of another at a public election
is inoperative as a vote.
The appointment of another to attempt to perform a non-
delegable act for the first may, in itself, be criminal or
tortious, as where a public officer permits a third person to
perform the essential functions of his office, or where an
agent, without authority to do so, appoints a subagent. The
Comment on §§ 400, 401, .406, 409 states consequences
which may follow an improper delegation.
Annotation:
Any person capable of transacting his own business may appoint an agent
to act in his behalf in all the ordinary affairs of life. Caley v. Morgan, 114 Ind.
350, 16 N. E. 790 (1888).
One who has authority to act for another cannot redelegate an authority to
do an act involving the exercise of judgment or discretion. New v. Germania
Fire Ins. Co., 171 Ind. 33, 85 N. E. 703, 131 Am. St. Rep. 245 (1908); Lucas v.
Rader, 29 Ind. App. 287, 64 N. E. 488 (1902).
Cochell v. Reynolds, 156 Ind. 14 (1900) (Authority to sign remonstrance
against granting license to person against whom agent saw fit to remonstrate,
held invalid.).
Ragle v. Mattox, 159 Ind. 584 (1902) (Authority to sign name to remon-
strances against all applicants for license, held valid.).
No Indiana cases were found involving contracts calling for personal per-
formance.
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Section 18. DELEGATION OF POWERS HELD BY A FmIUcLARY.
Unless otherwise agreed, a person cannot properly delegate
to another the exercise of discretion in the use of a power
held for the benefit of a third person.
Comment:
a. The rule stated in this Section is a special application
of the rule stated in § 17, since the personal discretion of
the one holding a power for the benefit of another is an es-
sential part of its proper exercise.
b. Delegation by agents. Unless the principal manifests
otherwige, an agent has no authority to delegate to an-
other the exercise of discretion in the performance of his
authority; nor may a servant delegate to another the per-
formance of service. This rule is to be distinguished from
the general rule as to the appointment of agents by other
agents; although many agents are employed to appoint other
agents, it is not usual to authorize a person to conduct a
transaction and at the same time confer upon him a power
of substitution with respect to matters involving the exer-
cise of discretion. Sections 78-81 state more specifically the
circumstances which are pertinent in determining the author-
ity of agents in both types of cases.
c. Delegation by fiduciaries generally. Trustees cannot
delegate to others the use of discretion in exercising their
powers, unless the terms of the trust so provide or unless, as
in the case of details involved in the management of trust
property, the act is of such a nature that it is inferred that
the exercise of personal discretion is not mandatory. A cor-
porate trustee must, of course, act through its officers and.
members.of its business staff. For the power of a trustee to
delegate, see the Restatement of Trusts. The same principles
apply to administrators, guardians, receivers, and other fidu-
ciaries. It is not within the scope of the Restatement of this
Subject to state the rules which limit the power of delega-
tion held by particular kinds of fiduciaries.
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d. Effect of attempted or improper delegation. The at-
tempt of a fiduciary to delegate power to another person
may be ineffective so that his appointee has no power, as
where one, holding the title to land as trustee through a re-
corded deed which discloses the trust, authorizes another
person to convey it in his discretion; in other cases, an ef-
fective transaction may result, as where a trustee of land
whose fiduciary capacity does not appear in the record, im-
properly authorizes an agent to sell and convey, and a con-
veyance is made to a bona fide purchaser. In some cases the
person to whom an improper but effective delegation is made
is subject to liability to the beneficiary, as he is normally if
he knows of the improper delegation. If, however, the fidu-
ciary has a legal title, his appoihtee, if without notice as to
the interest of the beneficiary, is protected (see Comment c
on § 349). Ordinarily, the attempt to delegate discretion
by one having a duty to use his own discretion is itself a
breach of duty although the appointee refuses the appoint-
ment or does no acts under it.
e. Those holding powers primarily for their own benefit
are to be distinguished from those holding powers in trust.
Thus, a shareholder in a business corporation, unlike a citi-
zen voting at a public election or a director of the corpora-
tion, may appoint another to vote for him, since he is not
a fiduciary with respect to his fellow shareholders.
Annotation:
One cannot redelegate an authority which involves the exercise of judgment
and discretion. New v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 171 Ind. 33, 85 N. E. 703, 131
Am. St. Rep. 245 (1908). Personal trust of agent cannot be delegated to an-
other. Wallace v. Morgan and Another, 23 Ind. 399 (1864).
Section 19. APPOINTMENT TO PERFoR M ILLEGAL ACTS.
The appointment of an agent to do an act is illegal if an
agreement to do such an act or the doing of the act itself
would be criminal, tortious, or otherwise opposed to public
policy.
Comment:
a. One may not properly appoint an agent to commit a
criminal or otherwise illegal act, but the appointment ordi-
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narily is not wholly ineffective. If the one directed to per-
form the act does the act directed, the person directing him
may be responsible criminally and, if a tort is committed,
civilly. Furthermore, the authorization gives an immunity
from liability, as between the parties, to the one doing the
act and, if the one acting is ignorant of facts making the
transaction illegal, he is entitled to compensation and in-
demnity (see Comment c on § 439 and § 467).
b. It is not within the scope of the Restatement of this
Subject to state what agreements or acts are illegal nor to
state generally the effect of illegality upon the relations
of parties to the agreement. The Restatement of Con-
tracts, §§ 512-609, states the rules by which the illegality
of a bargain is determined and the effect of such illegality
upon the bargaining parties. The liabilities between the
principal and agent where the employment is illegal depend
upon the principles stated therein. The special duty of an
agent to account for money received from or on account of
the principal, or for profits derived from an illegal trans-
action conducted by him for the principal, is stated in § 412
of the Restatement of this Subject. The liability for im-
properly causing an agent to violate his fiduciary duties to
another principal is stated in §§ 312-313.
c. Directions to agent to conduct illegal transactions. If
an agent obeys a direction to conduct a transaction with a
third person which is illegal for reasons other than the per-
sonality of the agent, the principal has the same rights and
is subject to the same civil liability with respect to the third
person as if he had conducted the transaction in person; a
direction to commit a tort or a crime subjects the principal
to tortious or criminal liability for its performance by the
agent to the same extent as if the principal had himself
committed the act, subject to the rules of criminal law in
regard to the responsibility of accessories. The principal's
responsibility for directing an illegal act is to be distin-
guished from the liability of a master or other principal for
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the crimes and torts of his servants or other agents com-
mitted in the course of the agency or the scope of the em-
ployment, under the rules stated in §§ 215-267.
d. Acts illegal if pe formed by agents. An act may be
criminal or tortious if performed by the agent although not
if performed by the principal, as where a statute provides
for the compounding of medicines only by a licensed per-
son, the principal alone having a license, or where the prin-
cipal has a personal privilege to enter premises. Whether
or not the license of the principal includes a power of dele-
gating his privilege of acting, as it does normally where a
license to sell is required, depends upon the construction
of the statute. If a statute requires the doer of an act to be
licensed, ordinarily an unlicensed principal may employ a
licensed agent to do it.
Statutes requiring agents to be licensed are sometimes en-
acted for the protection of principals, such as many of those
regulating the business of brokers. The effect of these stat-
utes may be not only to cause an agent who acts without
a license to be liable criminally but also to deprive him of a
right to compensation from the principal; the relations of
the principal with third persons are not thereby affected. If
the statute is passed for the protection of the public also, a
principal knowingly employing an unlicensed agent may be
deprived of the normal compensation or other benefit of an
act done by an agent, as where one whose business is that
of a public weigher, required to have licensed employees,
employs an unlicensed person to weigh goods.
As used in the Restatement of this Subject, the word
"statute" refers to legislation enacted by any lawmaking
body, including legislatures, administrative boards, and mu-
nicipal councils.
Annotation:
Appointment of agent to appear before legislature and urge claim to com-
pensation for principal, by which agent was to be paid by a percentage of the
award secured, is illegal. Coquillard's Adm'r v. Bearss, 21 Ind. 479, 83 Am. Dec.
362 (1863).
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Contract by one appointed to supervise performance of public work cannot
enter into contract to work for contractor doing the work. Cheney v. Unroe,
166 Ind. 550 (1906).
Topic 3. Capacity of Parties to Relationship
Section 20. CAPACITY OF PRINCIPAL.
A person who has capacity to affect his legal relations by
the giving of consent has capacity to authorize an agent to
act for him with the same effect as if he were to act in person.
Comment:
a. Meaning of capacity. A person has capacity to enter
into a legal relation if he has a power to create or enter
into the relation under the same circumstances in which a
normal person would have the power to create or enter into
such relation; if he does not have such power because of a
personal characteristic, he lacks capacity. Certain classes
of persons, such as married women at common law, infants,
insane persons and, in some states, aliens, have capacity to
create and enter into some legal relations but they have not
capacity to create or enter into othier legal relations which
are open to others who have full capacity.
A transaction between any two persons may be void or
otherwise illegal because of the nature of the transaction
and not because of the personal characteristics of either of
the parties (see §§ 17, 19). Likewise, it may be illegal for
a person having a certain relationship with another to enter
into transactions with him upon the ordinary terms (see §
18). In such cases, the lack of power to create a binding
legal obligation is not due to the lack of capacity as that
word is used in the Restatement of this Subject, since the
lack of power is not due to a personal characteristic.
b. Agency as a consensual relationship. Agency is not
necessarily the result of a contract; hence it is not necessary
for the appointment of an agent that the principal should
have capacity to contract. Agency is, however, a consensual
relationship, and therefore the principal must have capacity
to give a legally operative consent. Aside from statute, there
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are no special rules which limit the capacity of persons to be-
come principals. Thus, married women and insane personsi
can authorize agents to accomplish transactions if, but only'
if, they have capacity to become parties to such transactions.
c. Principals of limited capacity. The ordinary conse-
quences of agency follow the appointment of an agent by a
person of limited capacity, except that the appointment and
transactions done thereunder are subject to defenses which
the principal may have because of his lack of capacity.
Thus, infants and persons lacking full capacity because of
mental defects are affected by acts done on their account
by a person whom they direct so to act, to the extent to
which they have capacity to give consent and become parties
to the transaction. Likewise, aside from statute, to the same
extent that a married woman may be bound by her consent
to a delegable act, the act of an agent pursuant to her di-
rections binds her.
d. Matters not herein stated. Statutes may limit the ca-
pacity of persons to appoint agents to do particular types of
acts which they may themselves perform with legal effect.
Thus, statutes have been passed making illegal the appoint-
ment by married women of agents to convey property al-
though they have capacity to convey it by personal acts. It
is not within the scope of the Restatement of this Subject to
state the effect of such statutes. Likewise, no statement is
made as to what persons have capacity to give operative
consent, or as to the rules determining the liabilities be-
tween a principal lacking full capacity and the person whom
he appoints as agent, or the extent to which such a principal
is subject to liability for the tortious acts of his servant or
other agent which he does not authorize but for which a
principal having full capacity would be liable.
e. Acting for unincorporated groups. A person acting
for an unincorporated group of persons may be an agent
either of all members of the group or certain of them. If
the one who authorized him to act for all has also been au-
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thorized by all the members or certain of them to appoint
him, he is the agent of such persons. Thus, one appointed
by a member of a partnership who has been authorized to
act for the partnership is the agent of all the partners.
Whether one acting for other groups, such as clubs, is the
agent for the entire group or only of certain members there-
of is dependent upon the interpretation of the manifesta-
tions of those alleged to be principals.
f. Joint Principals. A number of pelsons may act joint-
ly in the authorization of an agent. In such case, the agent
may have power to subject them to joint liability to third
persons and may have contractual rights against them as
joint promisors.
Annotation:
Any person capable of transacting his own business may appoint an agent
to act in his behalf in all the ordinary affairs of life. Coley v. Morgan, 114 Ind.
350, 16 N. E. 790 (1887).
Appointment of agent by an infant is void. Weidenhammer v. McAdams, 52
Ind. App. 98, 98 N. E. 883 (1912); Burns v. Smith, 29 Ind. App. 181, 64 N. E.
94 Am. St. Rep. 268 (1902); Trueblood v. True6lood, 8 Ind. 195, 65 Am. Dec.
756 (1856); Tapley v. McGee, 6 Ind. 56 (1854).
Section 21. CAPACITY Op AGENT; IN GENERAL.
(1) Any person has capacity to hojd a power to act on
behalf of another.
(2) The extent to which the person holding such power
is a fiduciary and is subject to duties and liabilities to the
principal depends upon his capacity.
Comment on Subsection (1):
a. Any person may be appointed to act on account of an-
other and to affect the relations of that other by his conduct.
The power of a person to affect another who has consented
to an action by him on the other's account is limited only
by the agent's physical or mental ability to act. Capacity
to have rights or be subject to duties and liabilities is not
necessary. The incapacity of the agent to affect his own
legal relations by the performance of an act done on hiis
own account similar to that done for the principal does not
affect the resulting relations of the principal to third persons.
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Thus, an infant, a married woman, or a person otherwise so
incompetent that he cannot bind himself by a contract may
bind one who appoints him to make a contract for him. One
whom a court has adjudged totally insane but who retains
volition, or one who has had been deprived of civil rights,
has power to affect the principal as fully as if he had com-
plete capacity. A corporation, partnership, or other associa-
tion has capacity to act as agent; it may, however, be illegal
for a particular kind of association so to act.
b. One may hold a power to bind another although it is il-
legal for him to hold or exercise it. Thus, one forbidden to
act as agent without a license, although he may be penal-
ized for so acting, as in the case of a broker or attorney at
law, may nevertheless affect the one for whom he acts if he
does act. Likewise, where one acts as agent for two con-
tracting parties without tlhe knowledge of either, he may af-
fect the relations of each, although it is unlawful for him to
do it (see § 313). The effect of a statute, however, may be
to prevent, as well as to make illegal, the holding of a power.
Comment on Subsection (2):
c. Although all persons have legal capacity to hold pow-
ers, not all persons have legal capacity to be subject to fidu-
ciary duties. Thus, a person without capacity to bind him-
self because lacking in mentality may have a power to bind
one who appoints him to act, but he is not subject to the
duties or liabilities which result from a fiduciary relation-
ship. Likewise, an infant is not subject to the liabilities to
which an adult agent would be subject. It is not within the
scope of the Restatement of this Subject to state to what
extent partially incompetent persons are subject to fiduciary
duties.
d. Although the person appointed to act may not be sub-
ject to the normal duties resulting from fiduciary undertak-
ings, other consequences of a fiduciary relationship may re-
sult. Thus, irrespective of liability otherwise, if an infant
or married woman acquires something as agent, the principal
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may have rights with respect to it or may have quasi-con-
tractual rights. A statement as to the existence and extent
of such rights is not within the scope of the Restatement of
this Subject.
Annotation:
No Indiana cases are found declaring necessary capacity of agent.
Section 22. HUSBAND AND WIFE AS P1rNcnAL AND AGENT.
A husband or wife may be authorized to act for the other
party to the marital relationship.
Comment:
a. It is not necessary that the parties to an agency rela-
tionship have capacity to contract with each other. To the
extent that a married woman may contract or appoint others
as agent, she has capacity to appoint her husband to contract
or do other acts on her account, aside from statute. To the
extent that a married woman is subject to liability for the
torts of an agent, she is subject to liability for the torts com-
mitted by her husband acting as agent. Statutes sometimes
create a disability in the husband to convey his wife's prop-
erty at her request or to conduct particular types of trans-
actions for her.
b. Neither husband nor wife by virtue of the relationship
has power to act as agent for the other. The relationship
is of such a nature, however, that circumstances which in
the case of strangers would not indicate the creation of au-
thority or apparent authority may indicate it in the case of
husband or wife. Thus, a husband habitually permitted
by his wife to attend to some of her business matters may
be found to have authority to transact all her business af-
fairs. Likewise, if a wife is customarily permitted to order
household supplies, apparent authority on her part to pur-
chase things needed in the household may be readily in-
ferred.
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c. The power of a wife to subject her husband to liability
for necessaries when he does not supply them is to be dis-
tinguished from authority or apparent authority to purchase
household supplies. It is not within the scope of the Re-
statement of this Subject to state the rules as to the liabili-
ties in the first case, which are dependent upon quasi-con-
tractual principles and exist irrespective of consent by the
husband.
Annotation:
Wife may be agent of husband. Martz v. Selig Dry Goods Co., 76 Ind. App.
135, 13 N. E. 528 (1921).
Husband may be agent for wife. Howell v. Klein, 44 Ind. 290, 15 Am. Rep.
235 (1873).
No distinction between contracts made by husband as agent and those made
by a stranger as agent. Milhollin v. Milhollin, 71 Ind. App. 477, 125 N. E. 217
.(1919); Roper v. Cannel City Oil Co., 63 Ind. App. 637, 121 N. E. 96 (1918);
Runzon v. Snell, 116 Ind. 164, 18 N. E. 522, 9 Am. St. Rep. 839 (1888).
Wife may ratify unauthorized act of husband. Lichtenberger v. Graham, 50
Ind. 288 (1875).
Notice to husband is notice to wife when husband is acting as agent of wife
in the transaction. Forseythe v. Brondenburg, 154 Ind. 588, 57 N. E. 247 (1900).
Section 23. AGENT HAVING INTERESTS ADVERSE TO PRINCIPAL.
One whose interests are adverse to those of another may
be authorized to act on behalf of the other; it is a breach
of duty for him so to act without revealing the existence and
extent of such adverse interests.
Comment:
a. One may be an agent for another although he violates
his fiduciary duty to the other in acting as such. The dis-
abilities of an agent who has interests of his own or is in
charge of interests of a third person which conflict with the
interests of the principal, and the effect of such disabilities
upon the mutual rights and liabilities of principal and agent
are stated in §§ 289-398. The fact that the agent has inter-
ests adverse to the principal does not affect his power to
bind the principal to third persons who have no notice of the
adverse interests (see §§ 165, 199); transactions with third
persons with notice of them are voidable by the principal
(see § 166).
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Annotation:
No Indiana cases dealing with the effect of adverse interest upon the capacity
of one to act as agent for another and so create rights in and obligations upon
third persons toward that other have been found.
Section 24. ADVERSE PARTY TO TRANSACTION AS AGENT.
One party to a transaction may be authorized to act as
agent for Ihe other party thereto, except for the purpose of
satisfying the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
Comment:
a. An agent may be authorized to make a contract be-
tween himself and the principal and may be authorized to
buy from or sell to the principal. It is ordinarily under-
stood that an agent is not to do this without the principal's
knowledge and if he does so, the transaction is voidable. In
such cases, however, he may have power to affect the inter-
ests of the principal and, although it is wrongful for him
to exercise it, its exercise has legal consequences. The
position of the third person with respect to such situations
is dealt with in §§ 165-167, 199. The effect between prin-
cipal and agent is dealt with in §§ 389-390.
b. A party to a transaction within the Statute of Frauds
cannot orally confer power upon the other party to the
transaction to sign effectively a memorandum required to
satisfy the provisions of the Statute. A party may, how-
ever, orally confer power upon the agent of the other party
so to do.
Annotation:
Agent to sell may not purchase from himself; and court will compel recon-
veyance unless a ratification by principal with full knowledge is shown. Gage
v. Pike, 1 Smith 145 (1848).
An agent to sell may purchase from the the principal if all facts are dis-
closed to principal-burden is on agent to show be fairly dealt with principal.
Rochester v. Levering, 104 Ind. 562, 4 N. E. 203 (1886).
Contract by agent to sell with a partnership of which he is a member or a
corporation, in which agent is actively interested, may be repudiated by principal.
Bedford Coal & Coke Co. v. Parke County Coal Co., 44 Ind. App. 390, 89 N. E.
412 (1909).
No cases involving the exception were found.
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Topic 4. Relationship of Master and Servant
Section 25. GENERAL RULE.
The rules stated in §§ 20-24 as applicable to principal and
agent are applicable to master and servant.
Annotation:
No distinction has been made under sections 20-24 between strictly principal
and agent relationship and master and servant relationship cases.
(To be continued.)
